Hardware-Assisted Security and Trusted Computing

Faculty Involved: Stephen R. Tate
As trusted computing technology, and trusted platform modules (TPMs) in particular, become widespread, it is important to build a strong foundation for applications built on this new technology. This project is a structured effort to develop a model for trusted platform applications, using a layered approach that supports rigorous analysis and security proofs, and provides a basis for modular software design that directly maps to the analytic model.

Project activities are organized toward five specific objectives: development of concrete mathematical models for rigorous security analysis; analysis of specific widely-applicable functionality built on TPMs; development of a timing-accurate, extensible TPM simulator; study of TPM use in applications; and development of a layered security framework corresponding to the formal model. The project's approach is guided by two philosophies: keep it structured and simple (the principle of economy of mechanism) and justify constructions through rigorous analysis and proof.

Despite the growing use of trusted computing technology in modern systems, there has been very little formal research regarding this new technology. This project will fill this gap and provide a basis for future work in both using trusted computing technology and in designing extensions to the current technology. In addition to publications describing the knowledge gained, software for the extensible TPM simulator and the layered trusted computing framework will be distributed freely. The project will also result in the creation of a website that will be a portal for information on trusted computing and related research, and will include the development of a course on trusted computing and trusted platforms that will prepare both undergraduates and graduate students for work in this emerging area.

This project is funded by the National Science Foundation, under NSF award 0915735.

More information on sub-projects is available on the following pages: